Ritual, holophrastic utterances, and the symbolic mind by Johannes, Bronkhorst
 Johannes Bronkhorst 
Ritual, Holophrastic Utterances, and the Symbolic Mind 
1. Introduction 
The evolutionary proximity of human beings to other primates is sufficiently es-
tablished for studies of “the naked ape” or “the third chimpanzee” to be possible 
and justified.1 Nevertheless, many of those working in the human sciences insist 
that there are fundamental differences between humans and the other primates. 
Something happened in our evolutionary past which led to the rise of a number of 
features that we do not share with our evolutionary cousins. The most notable of 
these are language, ritual, religion and culture. What happened that had these mo-
mentous consequences? The following pages will propose an answer. Given the 
nature of the question, it is appropriate to begin with primates different from us. 
2. Symbolic representation 
In research carried out during the seventies at Georgia State University, two chim-
panzees – called Sherman and Austin – participated in an experiment meant to 
investigate whether chimpanzees could be taught to use language, and to what 
extent they would do so.2 Since the vocal tract of chimpanzees does not allow them 
to pronounce the sounds of human language, a different method was employed: the 
apes were taught to use a special computer keyboard made up of so-called lexi-
grams. The more specific aim of the experiment was to find out whether they 
would be able to use lexigrams in combinations. These combinations might then be 
looked upon as elementary syntactical relationships. The chimps were trained to 
chain lexigram pairs in simple verb-noun relationships. For example, the lexigram 
GIVE followed by the lexigram BANANA would result in the giving of a banana. 
GIVE followed by ORANGE would be similarly successful, but other combina-
tions would not. The following scheme, where « means “successful”, and ´ 
means “unsuccessful”, illustrates this: 
                                                     
1  These are the titles of two popular books on human behaviour by Desmond Morris (1967) 
and Jared Diamond (1992) respectively. 
2 See Savage-Rumbaugh & Rumbaugh 1978: esp. 279ff. 
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GIVE + BANANA → « 
GIVE + ORANGE → « 
BANANA + ORANGE → ´ 
ORANGE + GIVE → ´ 
etc. 
Initially our chimps would have just two “verb” lexigrams and four food or 
drink lexigrams to choose from. But the mere learning of a number of lexigram 
pairs was not sufficient for the chimps to understand the general system (viz. 
“verb” followed by “noun” leads to the appropriate result). They could learn indi-
vidual associations between specific pairs and their result, but for a long time they 
failed to grasp the system of relationships of which these correlations were a part. 
In the end they did grasp the system, but at the cost of thousands of trials in which 
they had to find out what combinations of lexigrams led to no result whatsoever. 
Once they had grasped the system, they had crossed the symbolic threshold. They 
had succeeded in using “words” as symbols in the special sense used here: as signs 
that do not only refer to “their” objects, but also to each other. 
For a correct appreciation of what follows it is essential to understand that the 
word symbol is not used here in its usual sense and that it should on no account be 
confused with it. I borrow the word in this specific sense – i.e. signs that do not 
only refer to “their” objects, but also to each other – from Terrence Deacon, who in 
turn borrowed it from the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Symbols of this kind 
play a role in what we will call symbolic reference. 
Even the highly condensed presentation of long and elaborate experiments 
given above shows how much is required to acquire symbolic reference. To cite 
Deacon: 
“What the animals had learned was not only a set of specific associations 
between lexigrams and objects or events. They had also learned a set of 
logical relationships between the lexigrams, relationships of exclusion and 
inclusion. More importantly, these lexigram-lexigram relationships formed a 
complete system in which each allowable or forbidden co-occurrence of 
lexigrams in the same string (and therefore each allowable or forbidden sub-
stitution of one lexigram for another) was defined. They had discovered that 
the relationship that a lexigram has to an object is a function of the relation-
ship it has to other lexigrams, not just a function of the correlated appearance 
of both lexigram and object. This is the essence of a symbolic relationship.”3 
                                                     
3 Deacon 1997: 86. 
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What Sherman and Austin learned with enormous and prolonged exertion we 
humans learn in our childhood, apparently with much less effort.4 Where the two 
chimpanzees took a long time to learn to pay attention, not just to the desired ob-
ject of their activity, but also to the signs and to their relationships with each other, 
we learn to do so almost automatically. Indeed, all normal human children learn the 
language of their care-takers. Yet the complexities of those languages are much 
greater than those of the simple sets of “words”, two in each set, which Sherman 
and Austin managed to master. All human children cross the symbolic threshold at 
an early age, without realising it. They are able do so because evolution has 
equipped us for this task, primarily by giving us a much enlarged prefrontal 
cortex.5 
Let us stay somewhat longer with our two chimpanzees. Initially, they had 
learned the combination GIVE + BANANA as an indivisible whole, which gave 
rise to a pleasant result, viz. that a banana was given to them. After thousands of 
trials and errors, they had mastered the system behind it. They had learned, for 
example, that the lexigram GIVE could be used with a following ORANGE so as 
to lead to a different result, viz. that an orange would be given to them. Meanwhile 
they had learned that these two outcomes had something in common, and that this 
common element was somehow represented by the lexigram GIVE. Similarly, 
other combinations had taught them that the lexigram BANANA was associated 
with the element banana in various activities. In other words, Sherman and Austin 
were in the process of creating representations corresponding to elements of ob-
jective reality. These representations were the result of the overlap of events: the 
representation “give” resulted from the overlap of “give banana” and “give or-
ange”. Human beings appear to arrive at their representations in a similar, though 
much more complex manner. 
These few reflections show that the learning of language facilitates the forma-
tion of representations. These representations correspond initially to the shared 
parts of different linguistic utterances, i.e. primarily words. However, these same 
reflections show that this process, once begun, does not necessarily stop here. We 
can easily imagine a situation where our chimpanzees wish to receive an object for 
which there is no lexigram on their keyboard, say a piece of chocolate. In that case 
they might create a symbolic representation, chocolate, which they would know 
how to deal with syntactically if only there were a lexigram CHOCOLATE, for 
example in GIVE + CHOCOLATE. In other words, once the learning of language 
has initiated the capacity of creating symbolic representations, the animal may be 
in a position to create new symbolic representations for which there are no words. 
                                                     
4 Only in extremely “unfavorable” external circumstances, such as those experienced by so-
called feral children, may human infants not succeed in acquiring language. On feral 
children, see Candland 1993; Newton 2002; Strivay 2006. 
5 See Deacon 1997: 145–318 (Part Two: Brain). 
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This accounts for the human capacity not only to create new words, but also to 
have symbolic representations for which there are no words.6 
Consider in this connection another ape, a bonobo called Kanzi. Kanzi, for rea-
sons that will not be discussed at present, acquired language to a degree far supe-
rior to Sherman and Austin. Strikingly, his linguistic skills subsequently facilitated 
other kinds of learning, even in domains that were not directly associated with 
language. Indeed, 
“his understanding encompassed all manner of novel events and even of 
metaphor. His understanding of language informed his interpretation of real 
world events and his broadened capacity to interpret and appropriately clas-
sify real world events informed his linguistic comprehension in a boot strap-
ping effect. An example of this was the ease with which Kanzi learned to 
flake stone tools given a modicum of both visual and verbal instruction. 
Similar attempts by other apes required long and arduous conditioning and 
shaping regiments.”7 
Crossing the symbolic threshold, it appears, involves more than being able to 
learn to use language. It opens up a world of representations which, by the boot 
strapping effect mentioned in this passage, extends well beyond the representations 
covered by the words of one’s language.8 
It is tempting to connect these reflections with what neurobiologists tell us 
about human consciousness. Consider the following passages from a recent book 
by Gerald M. Edelman, a neuroscientist: 
“By its very nature, the conscious process embeds representation in a degen-
erate,9 context-dependent web: there are many ways in which individual neu-
ral circuits, synaptic populations, varying environmental signals, and 
previous history can lead to the same meaning. 
[...] 
There is no single circuit activity or code that corresponds to a given con-
scious ‘representation’. A neuron may contribute to that ‘representation’ at 
                                                     
6 Symbolic representations must be distinguished from concepts. An animal of prey may have 
a concept of the animals that it hunts, in the sense that it will know and recognise them. 
Without symbolic representation, however, it cannot think about those animals the way those 
endowed with symbolic representation can. 
7 Savage-Rumbaugh & Fields & Taglialatela 2000: 916. 
8 It is for this reason hardly surprising that Kanzi is reported to have made, all on his own, four 
new “words”, standing for “banana”, “juice”, “grapes” and “yes” (New Scientist, 2 January 
2003). 
9 On p. 43 Edelman explains: “Degeneracy is the ability of structurally different elements of a 
system to perform the same function or yield the same output.” 
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one moment, and in the next have no contribution to make. The same is true 
of context-dependent interactions with the environment. A shift of context 
can change the qualia that are parts of a representation, or even recompose 
some qualia and still keep that representation. 
[...] 
[D]epending on input, environment, body state, and other contexts, different 
core states can underlie a particular representation. The interactions are rela-
tional and have the properties of polymorphous sets. These are sets, like 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ‘games’, that are defined neither by singly necessary 
nor by jointly sufficient conditions.”10 
Elsewhere Edelman draws attention to the hippocampus, a neural structure in 
the brain which is “necessary for episodic memory, the long-time memory of se-
quential events, the brain’s ‘narrative’”. He comments: “Higher-order conscious-
ness rests in part on episodic memory, and in the absence of such memory coherent 
semantic activity would not be likely to develop.”11 
It seems probable then that the overlap of episodic memories and other mental 
events plays an important role in the creation of representations in the mind, just as 
for Sherman and Austin the intersection of the useful units of communication 
GIVE + BANANA and GIVE + ORANGE led to the representation give. Symbolic 
reference greatly increases the number of representations thus created. It seems that 
Sherman and Austin had not analysed the representation give out of the numerous 
situations themselves in which they had been given various things. Only the exer-
cises with the lexigrams taught them to do so. We may assume that the same hap-
pens to human children when learning to speak. 
Symbolic reference makes, in this way, an almost limitless multiplication of 
representations possible, as well as their combination in countless ways. Indeed, 
worlds of imagination can now be created that take us away from our immediate 
impulses and experience. The results are multiple. Symbolic representation, to 
begin with, permits us to think, and speculate, about our own past and future and, 
what is more, to think about ourselves as characters in numerous scenarios. In this 
way, we can think about ourselves the way we think about others. This is what 
Deacon refers to in the following passage: 
“Consciousness of self in this way implicitly includes consciousness of other 
selves, and other consciousnesses can only be represented through the virtual 
reference created by symbols. The self that is the source of one’s experience 
of intentionality, the self that is judged by itself as well as by others for its 
moral choices, the self that worries about its impending departure from the 
                                                     
10 Edelman 2004: 105f. 
11 Ibid.: 99. 
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world, this self is a symbolic self. It is a final irony that it is the virtual, not 
actual, reference that symbols provide, which gives rise to this experience of 
self. This most undeniably real experience is a virtual reality.”12 
Symbolic representation influences our experience.13 We will return to this be-
low. It also allows us to be objective with regard to ourselves, which in turn is 
behind our tendency to judge ourselves the way we judge others (at least to some 
extent). This in turn allows for empathy on a wider scale than might otherwise be 
possible. Without symbolic representation there would be no detachment from 
immediate arousal and compulsion, no possibility to judge oneself the way we 
judge others, no place for moral choices, no developed forms of empathy, no ordi-
nary sense of self, and much else. 
Symbolic representation does not stop at self-representation. The immediate 
arousal and compulsion mentioned earlier, as well, are objectified and find a place 
in the “outside world” in the form of values and institutions. The result is as de-
scribed by Roy A. Rappaport, who uses the word symbol approximately in the 
same way as we do:14 
“The epochal significance of the symbol for the world beyond the species in 
which it appeared did not become apparent for many millennia – perhaps 
hundreds of millennia – after it had emerged. But earlier effects of language 
and even proto-language upon the lifeways of the hominids in its possession 
must soon have become enormous. [...] [L]anguage permits thought and 
communication to escape from the solid actualities of here and now to dis-
cover other realms, for instance, those of the possible, the plausible, the de-
sirable, [...] [However,] [l]anguage does not merely permit such thought but 
both requires it and makes it inevitable. Humanity is a species that lives and 
can only live in terms of meanings it itself must invent. These meanings and 
understandings not only reflect or approximate an independently existing 
world but participate in its very construction. The worlds in which humans 
live are not fully constituted by tectonic, meteorological and organic proc-
esses. They are not only made of rocks and trees and oceans, but are also 
constructed out of symbolically conceived and performatively established 
                                                     
12 Deacon 1997: 452. This self is what Dennett (1991: 418) calls the narrative self; see below. 
13 Van Driem, forthcoming: “The idea that language exerts an unfavorable effect on perception 
itself and blinds us to reality is an old idea already espoused by Bertus Brouwer and Frederik 
van Eeden.” 
14 Cp. Rappaport 1999: 4: “only humans, so far as we know, are possessed of languages 
composed, first, of lexicons made up of symbols in Peirce’s sense of the word […] or 
Buchler’s […]: that is, signs related only ‘by law’, i.e. convention, to that which they signify, 
and second, of grammars, sets of rules for combining symbols into semantically unbounded 
discourse.” 
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[...] cosmologies, institutions, rules, and values. With language the world 
comes to be furnished with qualities like good and evil [...]”15 
Once again, this description concerns the world experienced with the help of 
symbolic representation. The world experienced without it, if such a thing is possi-
ble, is without these features. 
The effects of symbolic representation go even further than this. Objective real-
ity is in part social reality. This is what John R. Searle set out to show in his book 
The Construction of Social Reality (1995). And indeed, it cannot be denied that 
there is “an objective world of money, property, marriage, governments, elections, 
football games, cocktail parties and law courts in a world that consists entirely of 
physical particles in fields of force, and in which some of these particles are or-
ganized into systems that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves”.16 In 
other words, “there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that 
are only facts by human agreement”.17 This social reality, which is real, is yet lan-
guage-dependent (chapter 3). In institutional reality, language is not used merely to 
describe the facts but, in an odd way, is partly constitutive of the facts.18 And being 
language-dependent, it depends on symbolic representation. 
Largely as a result of symbolic representation, human thought is, to at least 
some extent, narrative in nature.19 To cite the philosopher Daniel Dennett: 
“Our human environment contains not just food and shelter, enemies to fight 
or flee, and conspecifics with whom to mate, but words, words, words. 
These words are potent elements of our environment that we readily incor-
porate, ingesting and extruding them, weaving them like spiderwebs into 
self-protective strings of narrative. Indeed, [...] when we let in these words 
[...] they tend to take over, creating us out of the raw materials they find in 
our brains. 
Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control, and self-definition is 
not spinning webs or building dams, but telling stories, and more particularly 
concocting and controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about 
who we are.”20 
One of the characteristics of narrative is its so-called ‘chunking’ of experience. 
As a matter of fact, “[i]t is easier to organize knowledge and behavior if the vast 
realms of experience are subdivided; indeed, the world would quickly become 
                                                     
15 Rappaport 1999: 8. 
16 Searle 1995: xi–xii. 
17 Ibid.: 1. 
18 Searle 1999: 115. 
19 See, e.g. Turner 1996. 
20 Dennett 1991: 417–418. 
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unmanageable if I had to sort through every possible concept and potential course 
of action at every given moment.”21 To avoid the threatening chaos, the narrative, 
i.e. symbolic mind sifts through the data of perception and apportions different 
parts to different narratives. Depending on the “stories” in which “I” figure, certain 
objects will receive extra attention, others will be neglected. This sifting process is, 
once again, at least in part the result of symbolic representation. 
We may sum up what precedes by once more citing Deacon: 
“Because of our symbolic abilities, we humans have access to a novel 
higher-order representation system that not only recodes experiences and 
guides the formation of skills and habits, but also provides a means of repre-
senting features of a world that no other creature experiences, the world of 
the abstract. We do not just live our lives in the physical world and our im-
mediate social group, but also in a world of rules of conduct, beliefs about 
our histories, and hopes and fears about imagined futures.”22 
Here two points have to be emphasised. First, symbolic representation does not 
only affect the way we think, or the way we communicate, it also affects our cog-
nition and the way we experience the world. Second, the way we experience the 
world with the help of symbolic representation – in short, symbolic experience – is 
based on, and cannot exist without, non-symbolic experience. In other words, we 
have two cognitive styles, one of which (the symbolic one) cannot exist without the 
other, but not vice versa. Let us look at these two points: 
1.  Symbolic representation affects the way we experience the world. As 
symbolic beings we live in a constructed world, which contains many 
things that the real objective world, which is “outside” and indepen-
dent of us, does not contain, or which it only contains by human ag-
reement. Among these constructed things, as we have seen, we must 
count our objectified self (“self”, “soul”), our objectified urges (“va-
lues”, “morality”), objects to which a function has been attributed 
(bank-notes where there are only pieces of paper), and much else. 
2.  Symbolic experience is rooted in non-symbolic experience and would 
become seriously dysfunctional without it. Without non-symbolic ex-
perience we might lose contact with reality altogether, being locked, 
without possibility of escape, into a world of imagination that symbolic 
representation creates for us.23 The young child has pure non-symbolic 
experience, which allows it to subsequently “cross the symbolic 
                                                     
21 Herman 2003: 172. 
22 Deacon 1997: 423. 
23 According to certain sleep researchers, this is what happens in dreams. See Llinás & Paré 
1991; Jouvet 1999: 106f.; Jeff Warren 2007: 137f. 
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threshold” and make the quantum jump into the world of symbolic ex-
perience. But even after this jump it needs non-symbolic experience to 
anchor the world it constructs into objective fact. 
The conclusion we are led to draw is that we, normal human adults, experience 
the world in a double manner: a constructed world of symbolic representation is 
added on to a world of “raw” experience which underlies and accompanies it. 
What would non-symbolic experience be like, if it could free itself from sym-
bolic representation? Consider first the following passage from Searle’s book: 
“From a God’s-eye view, from outside the world, all the features of the 
world would be intrinsic, including intrinsic relational features such as the 
feature that people in our culture regard such and such objects as screwdriv-
ers. God could not see screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc., because intrinsically 
speaking there are no such things. Rather, God would see us treating certain 
objects as screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc. But from our standpoint, the 
standpoint of beings who are not gods but are inside the world that includes 
us as active agents, we need to distinguish those true statements we make 
that attribute features to the world that exist quite independently of any atti-
tude or stance we take, and those statements that attribute features that exist 
only relative to our interests, attitudes, stances, purposes, etc.”24 
We may not be gods, but our experience of the world without symbolic repre-
sentation would be close to the one attributed to God in this passage: we would see 
no screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc., but only the objects that people who do use 
symbolic representation treat as screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc. On the basis of 
our earlier reflections, we may add further features. If we could free ourselves from 
symbolic representation, we would have no “objective” notion of self, we would 
inhabit a world without values, and our expectations of the future and many of our 
memories of the past would not affect our present experience. And finally, we 
would not filter out many of the features of the world that have been neglected 
because they do not fit into any of our present narratives. 
Once again it will be interesting to cite the observations of a neurologist. Anto-
nio Damasio deals with the question of consciousness in his book The Feeling of 
What Happens (1999). He distinguishes between two kinds of consciousness, 
which he calls core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core conscious-
ness, he argues, is of a non verbal nature. Extended consciousness is based on core 
consciousness, and cannot exist without it. The reverse is not true: core conscious-
ness can exist without extended consciousness, and this is indeed what happens in 
certain neurological disorders. Extended consciousness, in the words of Damasio, 
“goes beyond the here and now of core consciousness, both backward and forward. 
                                                     
24 Searle 1995: 12. 
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The here and now is still there, but it is flanked by the past, as much past as you 
may need to illuminate the now effectively, and, just as importantly, it is flanked 
by the anticipated future. The scope of extended consciousness, at its zenith, may 
span the entire life of an individual, from the cradle to the future, and it can place 
the world beside it. On any given day, if only you let it fly, extended consciousness 
can make you a character in an epic novel, and, if only you use it well, it can open 
wide the doors of creation”.25 About the experience of core consciousness he says: 
“In a neurologically normal state, we are never completely deprived of ex-
tended consciousness. Yet it is not difficult to imagine what a possessor of 
only core consciousness probably experiences. Just consider what it may be 
like inside the mind of a one-year-old infant. I suspect objects come to the 
mind’s stage, are attributed to a core self, and exit as quickly as they enter. 
Each object is known by a simple self and is clear on its own, but there is no 
large-scale relation among objects in space or time and no sensible connec-
tion between the object and either past or anticipated experience.”26 
For our present purposes it is important to remember that extended conscious-
ness cannot exist without core consciousness, so that core consciousness is present 
in some way in every normal conscious human being. To this may be added that 
extended consciousness, whatever its neurological basis, is largely shaped by sym-
bolic representation. Damasio’s extended consciousness may therefore be consid-
ered as coinciding for a large part with the consciousness that results from sym-
bolic representation. Damasio’s observations confirm in this manner that symbolic 
experience is based on, and cannot do without, non-symbolic experience. 
Edelman, whom we met before, distinguishes between what he calls primary 
consciousness and higher-order consciousness. Even though he thinks that “it is 
likely that [such primates as chimpanzees] have a form of higher-order conscious-
ness”, he recognises that the acquisition of language makes a major difference. 
About this he says: 
“Clearly, one of the largest steps toward the acquisition of true language is 
the realization that an arbitrary token – a gesture or a word – stands for a 
thing or an event. When a sufficiently large lexicon of such tokens is subse-
quently accumulated, higher-order consciousness can greatly expand in 
range. Associations can be made by metaphor, and with ongoing activity, 
early metaphor can be transformed into more precise categories or intraper-
sonal and interpersonal experience. The gift of narrative and an expanded 
sense of temporal succession then follow. While the remembered present is 
in fact a reflection of true physical time, higher-order consciousness makes it 
                                                     
25 Damasio 1999: 195–196. 
26 Ibid.: 202. 
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possible to relate a socially constructed self to past recollections and future 
imaginations. The Heraclitean illusion of a point in the present moving from 
the past into the future is constructed by these means. This illusion, mixed 
with the sense of a narrative and metaphorical ability, elevates higher-order 
consciousness to new heights.”27 
Note that more is needed than just a “sufficiently large lexicon” of arbitrary to-
kens that stand for things or events. These tokens – as has become clear from the 
experiments involving Sherman and Austin – should be recognised and employed 
as symbols in the sense used here, i.e. as referring not just to “their” things or 
events, but also to each other, and as constituting a system of logical relationships 
with each other. 
 
In view of what has gone before we can use the image of a web woven by symbolic 
representation between us and the objects of our perception, a web that separates us 
from the outside world. This is of course only an image: there is no real web, and 
there is no real separation from the outside world. In reality, incoming signals are 
interpreted in the light of the numerous associations which they evoke. In the case 
of those who master symbolic reference, these associations are richer and far more 
intricate than for those who don’t. 
3. Mysticism 
In spite of its obvious insufficiencies, I will continue to use the image of a web 
woven by symbolic representation that situates itself between us and the outside 
world. Is it possible to push the web aside and experience the world in a more di-
rect manner? Are we condemned to remain separated from the objects of our per-
ception by this artificial construction that has interposed itself between us and the 
world? Some of the testimonies of people variously referred to as mystics, madmen 
and meditators suggest that the web sometimes tears, or is torn, whether on purpose 
or by accident.28 
Since William James, mystical experience has often been characterised as being 
ineffable and as possessing a noetic quality.29 Literal-minded philosophers find the 
                                                     
27 Edelman 2004: 103. 
28 Cf. Pyysiäinen 1993: 36: “mystical experiences may count as an exception to the linguistic 
quality of man’s being-in-the-world”; Staal 1990: 139: “mysticism is characterized by the 
absence of language. It points to a pre-linguistic state which can be induced by ritual, by 
recitation, by silent meditation on mantras, or by other means”. On the link of epileptic 
seizures with “deeply moving spiritual experiences, including a feeling of divine presence 
and the sense [of being] in direct communion with God”, see Ramachandran & Blakeslee 
1998: 179f. 
29 Wulff 2000: 400. 
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idea that it is ineffable, and therefore beyond the realm of language, puzzling.30 
Less cavilling readers may find this a particularly appropriate manner of describing 
experience that is no longer co-determined by symbolic representation, and there-
fore by language. Mystical and related experience is also said to give access to a 
different, higher reality, or to allow its subject to perceive things as they really are 
(this is James’s noetic quality). Indeed, a universal effect of mystical experience is 
said to be “an understanding that what was experienced was more real/important 
than any prior experience.”31 The second of these two claims corresponds to what 
we would expect to hear from someone who has succeeded in discarding symbolic 
representation, if only for a short while and perhaps only in part. Such a person 
may be expected to experience the world differently, and in a more direct and 
immediate fashion. For ordinary human experience is always separated from its 
objects by the web of symbolic representation. Seen this way, the claim that mysti-
cal experience gives access to a different and higher reality is, though not strictly 
true, almost correct. Experience through symbolic representation is indirect, medi-
ate. Experience without it, or with less of it, is direct, immediate. Strictly speaking 
it is the same “objective” reality that is experienced, but it is experienced so differ-
ently that the experiencer may have difficulty recognising it. Indeed, recognition 
itself involves connecting the present cognition with earlier ones. In non-symbolic 
experience the link with constructed former and anticipated later experiences is 
weakened, or absent. (We will see below that all associative links with the past 
may be interrupted during mystical experience.) The subject is, as a result, easily 
convinced that he or she is confronted with a different reality, where in actual fact 
it is the same reality that is experienced differently. Let me add that, if our mystic 
has to answer the question which of the two realities he or she has experienced is 
more real, the answer can easily be predicted. The mystical experience is so much 
more direct and immediate, and so undoubtedly real, that the choice is obvious: the 
reality experienced in the mystical state is more real than the one of ordinary ex-
perience. 
Other features commonly ascribed to mystical experience are easily explained 
by the weakening or disappearance of the web of symbolic representation. The 
ordinary self, for example, will tend to disappear. This does not surprise, given the 
fact that the ordinary self was a construction of symbolic representation to begin 
with. The unitary and undifferentiated nature of mystical consciousness empha-
sised by Stace (1960) and others is another feature that fits in well with the absence 
of symbolic representation. Let us recall that the symbolic cognitive style divides 
the world into representations. Without symbolic representation, reality presents 
itself as undivided, and therefore unitary. 
                                                     
30 See Gellman 2005: § 3.1. 
31 Paper 2004: 4. 
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It seems safe to conclude from all this that there are ways to free experience, if 
only temporarily and perhaps partially, from the web woven by symbolic refer-
ence.32 This extraordinary experience will subsequently be interpreted in ways 
proper to the culture of the person concerned. Such interpretations are, of course, 
of the greatest significance both to those who have these experiences and to those 
who study them on the basis of witness reports. However, they do not interest us in 
the context of the present investigation. 
We note in passing that this non-symbolic experience (the “mystical” experi-
ence) is highly valued and repeatedly sought after by many of those who have had 
it. There is a notable tendency to ascribe deep significance to it. We will have more 
to say about this below. 
 
Having established that there appear to be ways of discarding the web of symbolic 
representation, we may give some thought to the question of how this result is 
obtained. The aim is not to enumerate techniques and methods that are de facto 
used by mystics and others who succeed in having mystical experiences. Rather, 
we wish to consider what mechanism we would expect, in the light of our reflec-
tions so far, to lead to that result. 
In order to make progress, we have to abandon the image of a web woven by 
symbolic reference, and try to understand in a more factual way what happens 
when a person crosses the symbolic threshold. The case of Sherman and Austin 
will once again be helpful. Where these two chimpanzees had initially learned the 
connection between the pair of lexigrams GIVE + BANANA and the giving of a 
banana that followed, they had come to associate, after extensive supplementary 
learning, the single lexigram GIVE with a variety of situations and elements, 
among them other lexigrams. These numerous associations – with other lexigrams, 
with the order of lexigrams to be respected, with situations in which different 
things were given – allowed them to use this lexigram in a simple system of sym-
bolic reference. 
Essentially the same applies to human language users. A vast number of asso-
ciations allows them to use words the way they do. Many, perhaps most, of these 
associations are not conscious. But they are there, below the surface.33 Without 
them, language use would not be possible. 
What should one do to remove the web woven by symbolic representation? The 
obvious answer is: Stop the extra associations that constitute symbolic reference. 
                                                     
32 It will be argued below that culture, too, weaves a web of symbolic reference that is added on 
to, or integrated with, the “linguistic” web. 
33 Cp. Deacon 1997: 265–266: “The symbolic reference emerges from a pattern of virtual links 
between [neurological] tokens, which constitute a sort of parallel realm of associations to 
those that link those tokens to real sensorimotor experiences and possibilities.” 
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How does one stop innumerable associations, most of which are not even con-
scious? Focusing the mind presents itself as a plausible method. 
Focusing the mind is a faculty which humans and many animals possess. Situa-
tions that are particularly threatening, to take an example, make us forget almost 
everything else.34 This faculty is to some extent subject to ordinary conscious con-
trol. We then speak of concentration. It can take more extreme forms, in which 
case the expression absorption is to be preferred.35 Absorption typically accompa-
nies mystical experiences. Absorption, we must assume, reduces the number and 
perhaps the intensity of associations, including unconscious associations. What 
remains is an experience in which the associations that are responsible for sym-
bolic representations have been reduced or suppressed: a non-symbolic, mystical 
experience.36 
This explanation of mystical experience has an additional advantage. If focus-
ing the mind can reduce the number and/or intensity of associations, there is no 
reason to insist that in its strongest forms it affects only those associations that 
participate in symbolic representation. No symbolic representation is required to 
associate present with past experience: animals that have not crossed the symbolic 
threshold can yet learn from past experience, and therefore interpret the present in 
the light of the past. Mystical experiences that are completely timeless, and there-
fore without any associative connection with the past, can be understood as result-
ing from a state of absorption in which all associations with the past, including 
those that do not contribute to symbolic representation (if such exist), are inter-
rupted. In other words, focusing the mind can serve as an explanation for mystical 
experiences that are free from symbolic representation, but also for aspects of such 
experiences that cannot be fully understood by the mere absence of symbolic rep-
resentation. 
                                                     
34 The filtering of irrelevant information is preceded by activity in the prefrontal cortex and 
basal ganglia, particularly in the globus pallidus; cf. McNab & Klingberg 2007. 
35 “Absorption is the tendency to alter our perceptions and surroundings while in a state of 
highly focused attention with complete immersion in a central experience at the expense of 
contextual orientation” (Maldonado & Spiegel 1998: 59). 
36 Compare these reflections with the following passage from Pyysiäinen’s book Belief and 
Beyond (1996): “If we now define the so-called external mystical experience [...] as an 
experience with sensory input but with no thoughts, it corresponds rather well to [the] 
description of the receptive mode in which [...] logical thinking and categorization are 
reduced to a minimum [...] [S]uch experience would mean that syntax and the linguistic 
aspects of consciousness [...] as well as off-line thinking are turned off. Moreover, also 
consciousness of one’s own conscious nature [...], on which (together with language) the 
experience of self is based, supposedly disappears. What remains, is [...] on-line thinking, 
and an awareness of one’s sensations. The external world does not disappear from one’s 
consciousness, but is experienced as a here and now continuity with which oneself is 
coextensive.” 
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The explanation of mystical experience by means of absorption has a further 
consequence. There can be degrees of absorption, with, as upper limit, the total 
interruption of all associations. This upper limit is not necessarily reached by all 
those who have mystical or semi-mystical experiences. It follows that there is a 
sliding scale connecting “ordinary” and “mystical” experience. A slight reduction 
of the number and intensity of associative mental connections may be part of eve-
ryone’s daily experience, yet may not strike those who undergo it as particularly 
remarkable: they may not even take notice. 
4. Ritual 
Ritual is often accompanied by formulas, strings of speech sounds. In India the 
term used is mantra, and I shall occasionally speak of mantras when referring to 
these kinds of formulas. Frits Staal, in several publications (e.g. 1984; 1985; 2006), 
has drawn attention to the fact that mantras, when used as mantras, do not express 
meaning, at least not in the ordinary way. He does not deny that many, though not 
all, mantras have a form that resembles or is identical with linguistic utterances. He 
emphasises, however, that mantras, even those that consist of language, are not 
used as language. Formulas used in ritual settings are not analysed.37 Indeed, often 
they cannot be analysed. They may be in a language that is no longer used and that 
is unknown to those who hear or even pronounce the formulas. This is as true of 
the Latin of the Catholic mass38 as it is of the Vedic Sanskrit used in Brahmanical 
ritual. Sometimes the formulas are in no known language. This applies to many of 
the mantras used in Tantric forms of Hinduism and Buddhism. A more familiar 
example may be abracadabra. Whether or not this formula has a historical etymol-
ogy, it is and has been unanalysable and “meaningless” for most if not all of its 
users. 
Why should ritual formulas be unintelligible, “meaningless”? This question 
may find its answer in the observation that ritual formulas are, or perhaps have to 
be, holophrastic. Ordinary holistic phrases – i.e. the formulas we use in daily life – 
                                                     
37 Cp. Rappaport 1999: 151: “It is virtually definitive of ritual speech that it is stereotyped and 
stylized, composed of specified sequences of words that are often archaic, is repeated under 
particular, usually well-established circumstances, and great stress is often laid upon its 
precise enunciation. As Maurice Bloch [...] has emphasized, in contrast to ordinary discourse 
in which considerable choice is open to speakers at a number of points in any utterance, in 
ritual formulae the ‘features of juncture’, those components of speech indicating relations 
among the referents, are immutable. In M. C. Bateson’s [...] terms, ritual utterances are 
‘fused’. This is to say that meaning is derived from them as unsegmented wholes, or as 
wholes only segmented into minimal meaningful units of considerable length, usually much 
greater length than is the case in ordinary speech.” 
38 For an ethnographic description of the Latin mass, see Jucker 2007. 
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do have functions. They may have a literal meaning as well, but this literal mean-
ing plays a reduced role in the formula when used as formula. Sometimes the literal 
meaning may even be misleading. The phrase “how do you do?” is not a question 
about the way the person addressed does something. But even though the 
constituent words are misleading, the phrase is not without function, as anyone 
who refuses to use it in appropriate circumstances will soon discover. 
Ritual formulas, then, are like ordinary formulas, but more so. Ritual formulas 
often do not even pretend to have a literal meaning. Indeed, it seems to be a plus 
for ritual formulas to be unintelligible. Let us therefore forget about their literal 
meanings. What remains? Let us recall that ritual formulas, being holistic utter-
ances like formulaic phrases in ordinary language, can still have a function. Ordi-
nary holistic utterances, as recent research has shown, often “seem to be geared 
towards manipulating the situation in which the speaker finds him- or herself”.39 
Nothing prevents us from assuming that ritual formulas do the same. And indeed, it 
would be easy to provide illustrations of the frequently manipulative intent of the 
use of ritual formulas. In India, “mantras are understood by the tradition as poly-
valent instruments of power”;40 “their function [...] is a direct action, generally a 
ritual one, or a psychological or mystical one”.41 It seems natural to conclude that 
ritual formulas do have a function, but unlike ordinary formulas they no longer 
pretend to have a linguistic meaning as well. Ritual formulas, seen this way, are the 
perfect holistic utterances. Compared to ritual formulas, formulaic expressions in 
ordinary life are holistic only in the sense that we do not bother to analyse them. 
Ritual formulas are different: they are unanalysable. Like ordinary formulaic ex-
pressions, they have a function, often a manipulative one. Unlike ordinary formu-
laic expressions, they perform this function directly, without the intervention of the 
elements that are designated by the words that occur in ordinary formulas. 
Let us recall now the experiments in which the two chimpanzees Sherman and 
Austin learned, with great effort, to master symbolic reference. They started with 
what we might call holistic phrases like GIVE + BANANA. Once they had crossed 
the symbolic threshold, they could use the constituents of these phrases independ-
ently. They could, for example, use the lexigram BANANA in a new context cre-
ated by themselves. Our ordinary language use is of that type, though infinitely 
more complex. We can use words in a virtually limitless number of contexts of our 
own choosing. However, ritual utterances are different. They are holistic. They 
correspond to the combined lexigrams GIVE + BANANA before Sherman and 
Austin had learned to segment this sequence. This suggests that people who opt for 
the use of holistic phrases – which is what we all do in specific, “ritual” circum-
                                                     
39 Wray 2002b: 87. 
40 Alper 1989a: 6. 
41 Padoux 1989: 302. 
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stances – attempt, by so doing, to step back out of the realm of symbolic represen-
tation into the immediacy of non-symbolic experience. 
To avoid confusion, let me add that not all formulaic expressions are, for that 
reason, ritual formulas. Quite on the contrary, it seems clear that formulaic expres-
sions are also used in ordinary language, in play, and perhaps elsewhere. The 
question why certain formulaic expressions are accepted as ritual formulas whereas 
others are not, is interesting and deserves attention in its own right. It cannot be 
dealt with in this study. 
 
Let us turn to ritual action. Is it possible to maintain that ritual activity relates to 
ordinary activity in the same way as ritual utterances relate to linguistic utter-
ances?42 Let us recall that ritual utterances are holistic, unlike most utterances used 
in ordinary language. What is more, normal linguistic utterances exemplify sym-
bolic reference. Is it possible to say the same, or approximately the same, about 
ritual and ordinary activity? Is it true that ritual activity is holistic in some sense 
whereas ordinary activity is guided by symbolic representation? 
I suggest that this last question can be answered with a double yes. Yes, ritual 
activity is holistic, and yes, ordinary activity is guided by symbolic representation. 
The holistic nature of ritual activity can be established with relative ease.43 
Scholars have often observed that ritual actions are divorced from their usual goals. 
Some emphasise that they have no meaning, or that they are not communicative.44 
This does not mean that rituals never have a specific overall purpose; they often do. 
                                                     
42 This was Rappaport’s (1999: 151) position: “As far as form is concerned, ritual formulae are 
to ordinary language as ritual postures and gestures are to ordinary instrumental activity.” 
43 Cp. Rappaport 1999: 253: “to perform a ritual is not to analyze it. Indeed, the import of 
performance is exactly the converse of that of an analytic operation.” The correctness of this 
observation is not necessarily affected by the fact that many rituals consist of a concatenation 
of “elements of ritual” (Ritualelemente; Michaels 2007: 242). See Michaels 2007: 246: “Das 
Problem aller Morphologie des Rituals ist: Wenn Handlungseinheiten als kleinste Bausteine 
des Rituals genommen werden, dann entspricht dies nicht den Morphemen einer Sprache, 
sondern allenfalls den Sätzen [...]”. Similarly Lawson & McCauley 1990: 84 (cited Michaels 
2007: 246): “Returning, then, to the analogy with linguistics, it is the action that is the 
analogue of the sentence (which is the fundamental unit of linguistic analysis).” It is of 
particular interest, and very intriguing, that some people resort to semantic etymologising 
when trying to explain the elements of ritual: “[A]n important part of the Ndembu 
explanation of symbols rests upon folk etymologizing. The meaning of a given symbol is 
often, though by no means invariably, derived by Ndembu from the name assigned to it, the 
sense of which is traced from some primary word, or etymon, often a verb. Scholars have 
shown that in other Bandu societies this is often a process of fictitious etymologizing, 
dependent on similarity of sound rather than upon derivation from a common source. 
Nevertheless, for the people themselves it constitutes part of the ‘explanation’ of a ritual 
symbol” (Turner 1969: 11). For more on semantic etymologising, see below, Appendix 1. 
44 Staal 1990; Humphrey & Laidlaw 1994. 
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But “the set of sequences that compose the ritual are not connected to this goal in 
the same way as sub-actions connect to sub-goals in ordinary behavior”.45 Let us 
recall in this context what was said above about the frequently manipulative intent 
of the use of ritual formulas. Both ritual acts and ritual formulas can be used to 
reach some end, but both seek to do so in a holistic manner, forgoing the functions 
which their constituent actions and words (if there are any) would normally ac-
complish.46 
What about ordinary activity? Must we accept that it is guided by symbolic rep-
resentation? Yes, and the distinction between two cognitive styles introduced 
above explains why. Our dominant cognitive style is the one determined by sym-
bolic representation.47 It is the cognitive style that allows us to plan our lives and 
carry out projects of some complexity. It is this cognitive style that gave our an-
cestors, and us, an edge over competitors. It is the cognitive style on which our 
well-being, even our life, depends. 
Ritual activities, seen this way, are, like ritual formulas, a denial of symbolic 
representation. Like ritual formulas, they are an attempt to step back out of the 
realm of symbolic representation into the immediacy of non-symbolic experience. 
Neither ritual activities nor ritual formulas are symbolic in the sense used here. 
Both concern a “different”, “higher” reality, a reality not touched by symbolic 
representation. Rituals and ritual formulas have their role to play, not in our ordi-
nary world, but rather in the “higher” reality that is concealed by symbolic repre-
sentation. 
Does this mean that ritual activities are carried out, and ritual formulas uttered, 
with the intention of reaching mystical states? Scholars have pointed out that al-
tered states of consciousness do often accompany ritual.48 It is also known that 
ritual formulas are used in a number of traditions to evoke altered states of con-
sciousness: the use of mantras in Indian yoga and the so-called dhikr in Islam come 
                                                     
45 Boyer & Liénard 2006: 3. 
46 Cp. Rappaport 1999: 390: “It may be suggested [...] that ritual recaptures a state having its 
ontogenetic origin in the relationship of pre-verbal infants to their mothers. If this is the case 
the ground of the numinous precedes the development of any awareness of the sacred or the 
sanctified for, being discursive, that awareness can come only with language.” 
47 Cp. Deacon 1997: 257: “In general terms, human information processing should be biased by 
an excessive reliance on and guidance by the kinds of manipulation that prefrontal circuits 
impose upon the information they process. We humans should therefore exhibit a ‘cognitive 
style’ that sets us apart from other species – a pattern of organizing perceptions, actions, and 
learning that is peculiarly ‘front-heavy’, so to speak.” 
48 Cf. Rappaport 1999: 227: “ritually altered consciousness is widespread if not, indeed, 
culturally universal.” Staal 1990: 139: “mysticism [...] points to a pre-linguistic state which 
can be induced by ritual [...]” (cited above). According to Michaels (2006: 261), rituals 
“often create an auratic sphere or arena of timelessness and immortality”. See further 
Goodman 1988: 34f. 
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to mind. Nor is it surprising that these activities or recitations might bring about 
such results. We have seen that mental absorption can be a means to reach such 
states, perhaps the only one. Ritual activities and utterances may be conducive to 
mental absorption. The fact that the difference between ordinary and mystical ex-
perience is not abrupt, so that people can have “weak” or “partial” mystical states, 
confirms the claim that altered states of consciousness may accompany many if not 
all rites. 
In spite of this, I hesitate to look upon the search for altered states of conscious-
ness as the only explanation for ritual in all its manifestations. I rather assume that 
most if not all human beings, including those who are unfamiliar with altered states 
of consciousness, are implicitly aware of the fact that the world created by sym-
bolic representation is not the only world there is. This assumption gains in credi-
bility if we recall that even “ordinary”, i.e. symbolic experience is not always to the 
same extent accompanied by associative mental connections: concentration and 
absorption reduce them, if ever so little. Even the person least susceptible to mysti-
cal experience is likely to undergo the resulting fluctuations in the thickness of the 
web woven by symbolic reference. 
In a way we are obliged to make this assumption of an implicit awareness. The 
use of holistic utterances and holistic activities in ritual in widely separate cultures 
indicates that there must be such an awareness of the process that leads to ordinary, 
symbolic cognition, viz. through the division of an originally undivided cognition. 
Without the assumption of implicit awareness we might have to postulate that ritual 
utterances and ritual activities have been discovered by chance, presumably be-
cause these utterances and these activities gave rise to altered states of conscious-
ness. This postulate does not, as it seems to me, deserve serious consideration. We 
therefore hold on to the view that implicit awareness of the two cognitive styles 
common to all normal human beings is behind ritual in its various manifestations. 
 
Why should anyone – indeed, almost everyone – wish to act in or on the reality 
which is believed to be hidden below the surface of our ordinary experience? One 
reason is no doubt that virtually everyone, and not only mystics, is convinced that 
such a different reality exists, and that it is more real than ordinary reality. We have 
already seen that this conviction is almost correct. All humans are in possession of 
an alternative cognitive style which gives them more direct access to reality than 
symbolic representation does. All of them “know”, in some way, that their ordinary 
experience of the world is incomplete. There is another, “higher” reality, which has 
to be manipulated to secure one’s well-being. It cannot be manipulated with the 
help of symbolic reference. As a result, the manipulative tools provided by tradi-
tion – rituals and ritual formulas – are and have to be free from symbolic reference: 
they are, and have to be, holistic. 
Johannes Bronkhorst 184 
However, the implicit knowledge that people appear to possess about the nature 
of ordinary experience and its relation to a “different”, “higher” reality goes further 
than this. Symbolic representation is grounded in non-symbolic experience. Sym-
bolic representation allows for deception and dishonesty, because it can create and 
communicate imaginary worlds and situations. Escape from symbolic representa-
tion through ritual is, in a number of cases, an attempt to re-establish reference by 
grounding it in the real world. Deacon gives in this context the example of the 
Yanomamö Indians from Venezuela, notorious for the almost constant warfare 
among themselves.49 Occasionally peace is assured by means of an elaborate ritual 
known as a “Feast”. Deacon describes it as follows:50 
“First, the hosts who wish to make peace prepare a meal. When their guests 
are due to arrive, dressed as for war and carrying their weapons, the hosts 
put their weapons away and the men recline on their hammocks waiting for 
the guests to enter their village. The guests enter, dancing and chanting, and 
circle around the camp stopping in front of each host. There they ritually 
threaten them, raising an axe or drawing a bow and arrow. The hosts must 
remain unmoved, trying to show no fear and no offense at provocative re-
marks. After this has been repeated for a while (and latent hostilities have 
not erupted in violence), the roles are reversed. The guests recline in ham-
mocks, their weapons hidden away, while the hosts circle around the camp 
dancing and ritually threatening their guests. Finally, when it is clear that 
nothing untoward is likely to happen, they break off and the guests are of-
fered food. Later they may chant together, barter and exchange goods, or 
even arrange a marriage.”51 
It is ritual which protects hosts and guests from the surprise attacks which are 
otherwise common among this tribe. 
Grounding in the real world and the accompanying escape from symbolic rep-
resentation with its possibilities of lies and deceit52 may explain the use of ritual on 
other occasions, too. A wedding ritual goes beyond the promises that are ex-
changed. These promises are, by means of ritual, grounded in a reality in which no 
                                                     
49 Deacon 1997: 403f. 
50 Cp. Chagnon 1968: 97 ff. For a brief presentation and discussion of the recent allegation of 
mistreatment of the Yanomamö by this anthropologist, see Benson & Stangroom 2006: 154 ff. 
51 Deacon 1997: 404. 
52 This theme is taken very seriously by Rappaport in his study of ritual; see Rappaport 1999: 
11f. and passim. 
Ritual, Holophrastic Utterances, and the Symbolic Mind 185 
deception is possible.53 Similar considerations may be applicable to other rituals, 
but this topic cannot be further explored here. 
5. Mythology and religion 
Many of the points discussed above are relevant to the realm which we commonly 
think of as religion. Symbolic reference accounts for more than just language. It 
also creates a barrier that separates human beings from a more immediate experi-
ence of reality. What is more, human beings are in some way aware of this fact. 
Some succeed in breaking through this barrier and attain a more direct experience 
of the world; we have called them mystics. Others search for the hidden reality 
which they believe must exist by various means: we have considered ritual, but 
there are no doubt others, among them philosophico-religious speculation. The 
implicit awareness of a more direct access to the world in which we live often takes 
the shape of a deep conviction that there is a higher reality, different from the ordi-
nary world. What is more, there appears to be an implicit awareness that the world 
of our ordinary experience has come forth out of that higher reality. This notion 
may find expression in “creation myths”, stories which speak of the transition from 
an initial undivided whole subsequently divided. A primordial formless substance 
takes form, often under the influence of the spoken word. Rappaport gives a num-
ber of examples from a variety of cultures.54 Also the idea that the highest reality is 
an encompassing whole is known to religious thought. The present study will not 
enter into an analysis of these beliefs. It can, however, be suggested that they con-
tain an element of truth. Our world has indeed arisen out of an earlier one that was 
not yet divided. And this undivided whole is really still there and underlies all our 
cognition. But the transition from an undivided to a multiple world did not happen 
at the beginning of cosmic time. It took place in our childhood, when we, each of 
us individually, crossed the symbolic threshold. 
The preceding reflections, if correct, show that symbolic reference, and the 
symbolic representation which results from it, have a profound effect on the way 
we experience the world. Symbolic representation is, in an important sense, that 
which makes us human, that which distinguishes us even from our nearest cousins 
in the animal realm. It does not just allow us to learn and use language, it provides 
us with the implicit or explicit conviction that there is a “deeper” or “higher” real-
ity behind the “ordinary” reality which we experience in our everyday lives. This 
in its turn impels us to carry out certain forms of activity (“rituals”), and induces us 
                                                     
53 This observation is at variance with Deacon’s view according to which marriage is essen-
tially a symbolic relationship the need for which explains the acquisition of language by 
early humans: “Symbolic culture was a response to a reproductive problem that only symbols 
could solve: the imperative of representing a social contract.” (1997: 401). 
54 Rappaport 1999: 162ff. 
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to think certain kinds of thoughts. In view of all this, it is hard to overestimate the 
importance of symbolic reference. This in its turn raises the question whether sym-
bolic reference makes itself also felt in other domains of human activity. The next 
section will argue that it does, and that culture may be one such domain. 
6. Culture 
We have so far considered symbolic representation in connection with language 
and, in particular, with vocal utterances. There is, however, no reason to believe 
that the faculty that allows us to create symbolic representation is only active in the 
presence of vocal utterances. This same faculty allows the deaf to use sign lan-
guage, which employs gestures rather than vocal utterances. Sign language has 
syntax like ordinary language, and shares many features with it. It is indeed possi-
ble that gestures preceded vocal signs in the historical development of language.55 
However, we may go one step further and consider that the faculty which makes 
symbolic representation possible is not confined to language in any of its forms, 
whether vocal, gestural, or other (including lexigrams). 
As pointed out above, the crucial faculty that enables the human infant to learn 
language is the capacity to pay attention not just to the objects in its environment, 
but also to features – whether vocal, gestural, or other – that it interprets as signs of 
those objects. This capacity allows, even obliges, the child to pay attention to fur-
ther signs that are somehow related to these initial signs, and to the relationships 
between them. We have seen that the child uses this capacity when learning the 
language of its caretakers. This capacity is not, however, confined to the signs that 
make up this language. It also covers everything else that the infant associates, for 
whatever reason, with the objects of its experience and which it therefore interprets 
as signs.56 The very capacity that allows the child to learn its language will also 
make it pay attention to other, non-linguistic, “signs” and look for the ways in 
which these signs are interrelated. In the case of language, the system of relation-
ships between linguistic signs which it ultimately adopts is the structure that gov-
erns the language of the child’s caretakers. In the case of other, non-linguistic 
“signs”, too, the child is likely to adopt the system of relationships that its 
caretakers adhere to. 
These somewhat abstract reflections suggest that the child, at the appropriate 
age, is not only busy acquiring its language. Alongside language, it explores the 
relationships that may exist between other potential signs. As in the case of lan-
                                                     
55 See Rowan Hooper in New Scientist of 5 May 2007, 6f. 
56 Cp. Deacon 1997: 264: “The contributions of prefrontal areas to learning all involve, in one 
way or another, the analysis of higher-order associative relationships. More specifically, [...] 
they are necessary for learning associative relationships where one associative learning 
process must be subordinated to another.” 
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guage, the child will in the end settle on the web of relationships which is the one 
accepted by those in its surroundings, or one close to it. It follows that the faculty 
underlying symbolic representation weaves not just one, but two webs that separate 
us from the outside world. One of these is the web woven by language; we have 
discussed it at some length. The other is the web woven by the non-linguistic signs 
that have come to be recognised as such in the culture of the individual concerned. 
This web of non-linguistic signs can vary from culture to culture. Examples will 
therefore be culture-specific. As a widely understood, yet simple, and no doubt 
simplifying, example from the western world we may consider the Christmas 
tree.57 The Christmas tree is not just a sign that designates something (Christmas, 
the birth of Christ, or something else again). It is also, perhaps even primarily, an 
element in a wide web of associations, at least for those who have grown up in 
cultures where Christmas was celebrated. People who have grown up in other cul-
tures may learn what the Christmas tree stands for, they will, however, not share 
this wide associative web. A Christmas tree will not “mean” anything to them. In 
the case of those for whom it “means” something, we may assume that the Christ-
mas tree is treated in a way not dissimilar to the way in which symbols (i.e. 
Peircean symbols, primarily the words of language) are treated. Like words, the 
Christmas tree is used to construct a system, a web of associations. (Unlike words, 
it may here be added, the Christmas tree and other cultural “symbols” are not likely 
to give rise to the precise representations that the use of words obliges their users to 
create.) 
It may be justified to say that this web, or rather the accumulation of webs of 
which the Christmas-tree-web may be one, is the culture in which the child grows 
up.58 As in the case of language, the web of culture may affect cognition. Interest-
ingly, there is some evidence to suggest that cultures do indeed affect cognition 
differentially, that is to say, members of different cultures cognise the world differ-
ently.59 
                                                     
57 The first four notes of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony constitute another example. Marvin Minsky said 
the following about them: “no one could remember Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony entire, from a 
single hearing. But neither could one ever hear again those first four notes as just four notes! Once 
but a tiny scrap of sound, it is now a Known Thing – a locus in the web of all the other things we 
know, whose meanings and significances depend on each other.” (Cited in Sacks 2007: 211). 
58 For a recent discussion of culture, see Plotkin 2007a. 
59 See Plotkin 2007: 236ff., with references to various publications (Lillard 1998; Nisbett et al. 
2001; 2003; 2005; Siok et al. 2004; Atran 1998; Medin & Atran 2004; Greenfield et al. 2003; 
Cole 2006). This suggestion is parallel to the hypothesis according to which individual 
languages are responsible for the way their users understand the world and act in it, the so-
called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis; see, e.g. Gleitman & Papafragou 2005. Indeed, some maintain 
that the two theories cannot be separated: “a language is shaped by its culture, and a culture is 
given expression in its language, to such an extent that it is impossible to say where one ends 
and the other begins, i.e. what belongs to language and what to culture” (Grace 1987: 10). 
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The web of culture, like the web of language, can be torn, presumably by the 
same method, viz. when the person concerned enters into a state of absorption. 
This suggests that the so-called mystics experience a world that is not only free 
from all that language has superimposed on it, but also from numerous other su-
perimpositions, which we may globally refer to as cultural superimpositions. 
It follows from what precedes that the very capacity that enables us to learn and 
use language and is behind certain behaviours and experiences which are com-
monly referred to as religious, may also be responsible for human culture.60 This 
capacity identifies certain objects and sensory inputs as signs of others, and looks 
for the system of their mutual relationships. A subset of these signs along with their 
mutual relationships constitutes language. Others constitute networks of con-
nections, systematised and rationalised in ways that may differ from one culture to 
the next (just as languages vary). These networks of connections may incorporate 
background assumptions about the nature of the world around us. They may also, 
as in the case of the Christmas tree, have a primarily emotional character, and give 
“meaning” to our world. As in the case of language, these networks of associative 
connections are likely to be deeply anchored in each person. And as in the case of a 
first language, considerable effort may be required for alternative networks to find 
a place beside the original ones. 
Appendix 1: Semantic etymologies61 
Symbolic reference is essential for language learning. It allows us to “extract” 
words from larger utterances, just as Sherman and Austin had “extracted” GIVE 
from GIVE + BANANA. However, there is no obvious reason why this analytical 
process should stop at words. We might expect that human beings are inclined to 
push the analysis further, so that symbolic reference then goes beyond the level at 
which it is useful in daily life, and overshoots the mark, so to speak. This is what 
happens in the phenomenon to be considered in this Appendix. 
Let us recall that human beings, more than chimpanzees, have the capacity to 
analyse acoustic and other inputs so as to discover symbols that may be hidden in 
them. Sherman and Austin had a hard time segmenting the unit GIVE out of the 
combinations GIVE + BANANA and GIVE + ORANGE. Human children seg-
ment countless words out of a linguistic input that contains no clear indications as 
to where one word ends and the next one begins, even less where one morpheme 
                                                     
60 It goes without saying that the term “religion” as commonly used also covers certain behavi-
ours and experiences that are “cultural” in the sense here employed. In terms of the theory 
here presented, what is ordinarily understood as religion combines elements that require 
different explanations: some are “cultural” features, others fall into the category of “attempts 
to step back out of the realm of symbolic representation”. 
61 Many of the examples given in this Appendix have been taken from Bronkhorst 2001. 
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ends and the next one begins. These same children nevertheless succeed in attrib-
uting meanings to the results of their segmentations. The question is, do children, 
and adult speakers for that matter, stop at the commonly recognised words of lan-
guage, or do they move on beyond words, perhaps even beyond the morphemes 
that make up words? 
This question is of some importance. If one thinks that words correspond to pre-
existing representations, language users will then divide the linguistic input they 
receive into words that fit those pre-existing representations, and no further, be-
cause there are no representations further down the line.62 In this publication we 
take a different position: many representations are created, often (but not always) 
on the basis of the words of language. This position leads to the reasonable expec-
tation that the segmentation that humans apply to their linguistic input is not halted 
once they arrive at some presumably natural representations. We would rather 
expect that human segmenting extends also beyond the words of language, into the 
realm of parts of words and perhaps even individual sounds.63 This is indeed what 
we find. Human segmenting of this kind finds expression in the phenomenon 
which I will call semantic etymologising. This phenomenon is widespread. 
A semantic etymology is to be distinguished from a historical etymology. A 
historical etymology presents the origin or early history of a word; it tells us, for 
example, that a word in a modern language is derived from another word belonging 
to an earlier language, or to an earlier stage of the same language. The English 
word militant, for example, is derived from Latin militans through the intermediary 
of French militant. And the Hindi pronoun maim ‘I’ is derived from Sanskrit mayâ 
‘by me’ through Prakrit mae.64 Semantic etymologies do something different. They 
connect one word with one or more others which are believed to elucidate its 
meaning. The god Rudra, for example, has that name according to the Vedic 
Satapatha Brâhmana (6.1.3.10), because he cried (rud-) in a story that is told about 
him. Semantic etymologies tell us nothing about the history of a word, but some-
thing about its meaning. 
Semantic etymologies have largely gone out of fashion these days. Most sensi-
ble people have serious doubts about the possibility of finding the meaning of one 
word by comparing it with other, more or less similar words. We tolerate such 
semantic etymologising from children, who indulge in it quite freely, as Jean 
Piaget (1925) and others after him have shown. We are less tolerant with respect to 
adults who do so; the person who analyses the word contentment as concerning 
                                                     
62 See Pinker 2007: 89f. for a discussion of different points of view regarding representations 
(there called “concepts”) in language and thought. 
63 The question of individual speech sounds is tricky, for the notion that speech can be analysed 
into a sequence of phonemes, and their perception has been argued to be inseparable from 
alphabetical writing; Warren 1999: 169f. 
64 Oberlies 1998: 17. 
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being content with men, or with tea (content-men-t), is diagnosed as schizophrenic 
by modern investigators, perhaps rightly so.65 
And yet semantic etymologies are widespread in all pre-modern cultures. Here 
are some examples: 
In the Sumerian myth of Enki and Ninhursag the former is cured when 
Ninhursag causes deities to be born corresponding to Enki’s sick members: “The 
correspondence between the sick member and the healing deity rests on the [...] 
etymologizing of the ancient scribes; the Sumerian word for the sick organ con-
tains at least one syllable in common with the name of the deity. Thus e.g. one of 
the organs that pained Enki was the ‘mouth’, the Sumerian word for which is ka, 
and the deity created to alleviate this pain is called Ninkasi; similarly, the goddess 
born to alleviate the pain of the rib, the Sumerian word for which is ti, is named 
Ninti, etc.”66 
An ancient Egyptian text carved inside two pyramids dating from the twenty-
forth century B.C.E. “is full of plays on words” such as: “O Atum-Kheprer, [...] 
thou didst arise (weben) as the ben-bird of the ben-stone in the Ben-House in 
Heliopolis.”67 Sauneron adds further examples and points out that ‘plays on words’ 
were considered to give an ‘explanation’ of the world.68 
In the Hebrew Bible etymologies are common, especially in connection with 
names: Adam is linked with adama ‘earth’ (Gen. 2.7); woman, isha, is derived 
from man, ish (Gen. 2.23); Cain from qaniti ‘I have gotten’ (Gen. 4.1); etc.69 
Kirk70 emphasises the use of etymologies in Greek myths and states: “The poets 
of the Homeric tradition were already intrigued by the resemblance of the name 
‘Odysseus’ to the verb odussomai ‘I am angry’. [...] Pytho, the old name for Del-
phi, is derived [in the Hymn to Apollo, probably late seventh century B.C.E.] from 
the serpent destroyed there by Apollo and allowed to rot, puthein. [...] Heraclitus 
the Presocratic philosopher found it significant that one word for a bow resembled 
the word for ‘life’ (biós and bíos), and Aeschylus related the name of Helen to the 
idea that she ‘took the ships’ (hele-naus), that of Apollo to apollunai, ‘destroy’, 
and that of Zeus to zên, ‘live’.”71 Similar efforts at etymologising characterise later 
Greek antiquity.72 
                                                     
65 So Werner & Kaplan (1963: 259), citing a patient of Maria Lorenz (1961: 604). 
66 Kramer 1969: 37, n. 13. 
67 Wilson 1969: 3. 
68 Sauneron 1957: 123f. See further Morenz 1957; Sander-Hansen 1946, esp. 19f. 
69 Böhl 1991: 163f. 
70 Kirk 1974: 57f. 
71 Ibid.: 58. 
72 For a study of the etymologies in Homer, see Rank 1951; also Kraus 1987: 31f. For an 
(incomplete) list of etymologies in Plutarch, see Strobach 1997: 186f. 
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An example from medieval Europe is provided by the secret spiritual organi-
sation of the Fedeli d’Amore, whose representatives were active in France, Italy, 
and Belgium from the twelfth century onward. They used a hidden language in 
order to keep their mystery of love secret. Love for them is a soteriological means, 
and accordingly the word amor ‘love’ is interpreted as a-mor ‘without death’: 
A senefie en sa partie 
Sans, et mor senefie mort; 
Or l’assemblons, s’aurons sans mort.73 
Caesarius of Heisterbach (ca. 1170 – ca. 1240) gives an explanation of the word 
mors ‘death’ in his Dialogue on Miracles:74 
“Through the transgression of the first created, death entered into the world. 
Hence death (mors) received its name from ‘biting’ (morsus). As soon as 
man bit (momordit) the apple of the forbidden tree, he incurred death and 
subjected himself as well as his whole posterity to its necessity. Death is also 
said to have come from ‘bitterness’ (amaritudine), because, as it is said, no 
pain in this life is more bitter than the separation of body and soul.” 
Elsewhere he explains the word puer, “boy”: “Puer (‘boy’) signifies purus 
(‘pure’)”.75 
An example from ethnographic records is the following: Among the inhabitants 
of the Trobriand islands the word vatuvi occurs in a magical formula.76 This word 
has no grammatical form; it is neither noun nor verb. Malinowski observes: 
“the real etymological identity of this word will define it as connected with 
vitawo, or the prefix vitu-, and the word vituvatu, ‘to institute’, ‘to set up’, 
‘to direct’, ‘to show’. [It has] also [...] fortuitous, but magically significant 
associations with vatu, ‘coral boulder’, ‘coral reef’, and the more or less real 
word va-tuvi, ‘to foment’, ‘to make heal’.”77 
All these semantic etymologies illustrate one and the same phenomenon: the 
search for expressive units beyond the level recognised in the speech community 
concerned. They remind us that the capacity for symbolic reference was not created 
for language learning (even though its usefulness in language learning no doubt 
explains the selective advantage it offered). 
                                                     
73 See Eliade 1986: 112. 
74 Cited in Zaleski 1988: 50. 
75 Cited in ibid.: 52. 
76 Malinowski (1935: vol. 1: 96; vol. 2: 257) describes it as the most important formula in all 
Omarakana garden magic. 
77 Malinowski 1935: vol. 2: 249; cf. 260–261. Regarding the last association, va-tuvi, 
Malinowski observes (ibid.: 260–261): “As a matter of fact, one or two natives [...] gave me 
this explanation of the word when commenting upon the spell.” It is not clear whether any 
native made the association with vatu explicit. 
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The Chinese language, with its monosyllabic words, lends itself less easily to an 
analysis beyond the level recognised in the speech community. However, its many 
homonyms invite its users to connect unrelated things that have the same name. 
Indeed, “Han commentators applied a form of correlative thought in their phi-
lological studies, frequently explaining the meaning of obscure characters by sound 
analogy on the assumption that a phonetic correspondence indicated a semantic 
relation”.78 “Sometimes highly complex circular shou emblems [symbols of long 
life or immortality] had incorporated into their design a swastika (pronounced 
wan), to express by a pun the concept of wan shou, meaning ‘ten thousand years of 
long life’.” Similarly: “The endless knot [was] interpreted [...] as symbolizing 
Buddha’s intestines (ch’ang). [...] [S]ince its name, ch’ang, made a pun on the 
word for long, the whole figure [...] symbolized [to the later Chinese] a long life 
[...]”79 etc. An example closer to our time is found in the weekly journal Newsweek 
of July 6, 1987, p. 18: “Hong Kong’s new British governor, Sir David Wilson, 
bowed to local tradition by changing his Cantonese name, Ngai Tak-ngai, shortly 
before assuming office last April. Its characters were homophones for the phrase 
‘so hypocritical it’s dangerous’; his new moniker, Wai Yik-shun, means ‘guardian-
ship’ and ‘trust’, conjuring up more soothing images to colony residents [...]”. 
These examples do not illustrate the search for expressive units beyond the level 
commonly recognised, but something different. They illustrate the search for a 
shared semantic interpretation of minimal units, even where the speech community 
assigns different interpretations to them. This search is, of course, similar to the 
search that allowed Sherman and Austin to arrive at one representation for GIVE, 
starting from GIVE + BANANA and GIVE + ORANGE. 
Appendix 2: Symbolic reference and the origin of language 
The origin of language is increasingly debated. To get an impression of some cur-
rent opinions, we turn to a recent issue of the journal Lingua, which is dedicated to 
language evolution.80 One of the contributors, Derek Bickerton, points out that 
“[t]his is an interdisciplinary game, played by biologists, neurologists, anthropolo-
gists, archaeologists, computer scientists, philosophers, and more – as well as [...] 
by linguists”.81 On the following page he emphasises the distinction between “lan-
guage evolution” and “changes in languagES”82. The former is part of the biologi-
cal evolution of humans, the latter belongs to the realm of cultural change. 
                                                     
78 Henderson 1984: 19–20. 
79 Cammann 1962: 98, 99–100. 
80 Lingua 117/3 (2007): 503–604. 
81 Bickerton 2007: 510. 
82  Ibid. 511. 
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An essential concept in the study of language evolution is protolanguage. Says 
Bickerton: “The notion that the earliest stages of language evolution involved a 
largely if not entirely structureless protolanguage [...] is now so widely accepted 
that the term seems to have passed into the general vocabulary of language 
evolutionists.”83 This protolanguage is, as indicated, largely if not entirely 
structureless. What were its constituents? According to Bickerton, “there does not, 
as yet, exist any compelling reason for rejecting the original concept of a protolan-
guage as containing a categorially complete, if severely limited vocabulary of 
items roughly equivalent to modern words, but lacking a sophisticated phonology 
and any consistent structure”.84 
Not everyone accepts this position. A rival one is the theory according to which 
protolanguage was holophrastic. Bickerton says the following about it: 
“[T]he most radical proposal with regard to the constituents of protolan-
guage is that these were holophrastic rather than synthetic. This proposal has 
been most thoroughly developed by [Alison] Wray [...]. Wray’s proposals 
support genre continuism, since [...] animal calls are roughly equivalent to 
holophrases, rather than words. Wray claims that protolanguage simply in-
creased the number of such units to a point where they began to impose an 
excessive memory load, at which point the holophrases were decomposed on 
the basis of phonetic similarities. Here we can do no better than quote 
Wray’s own example: ‘So if, besides tebima meaning give that to her, 
kumapi meant share this with her, then it might be concluded that ma had 
the meaning female person + beneficiary.’ ([Wray] 2000: 297)”85 
Bickerton does not agree with this proposal, as is clear from his comments: 
“This leaves out of account the possibility that, although the syllable ma 
might occur as Wray suggests, it would also occur in a number of holo-
phrases lacking any references to either females or beneficiaries. Not only is 
this extremely likely, but the only possible alternative is, if anything, even 
more damaging to Wray’s case. For if ma occurred always and only where 
female beneficiaries were involved, the holophrastic protolanguage would be 
a hollow charade, a mere disguise for a medium already fully synthetic. But 
if ma also occurred where a female + beneficiary was impossible – contexts 
perhaps as numerous as, or more numerous than, those that can bear such a 
reading – why would the hearer assume that it referred to a female benefici-
                                                     
83 Ibid.: 515. 
84 Ibid.: 517. 
85 Ibid.: 516–517. 
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ary in just those cases where such a reading was possible, and how would 
that hearer account for the other cases?”86 
For further arguments against the holophrastic model Bickerton refers to one of 
his own earlier publications (Bickerton 2003) and to the contribution of Maggie 
Tallerman in the same issue of Lingua (Tallerman 2007). 
Alison Wray, the main target of Bickerton’s criticism, is also a contributor to 
this issue of Lingua, in an article that is co-signed by George W. Grace. The two 
authors describe their understanding of the first language users in the following 
words:87 
“[W]e must understand that what made the very first language users differ-
ent from their parents was that they possessed the capacity to identify pat-
terns inside their existing message units and extract (apparently) recurrent 
material for recombination. [...] The first ‘segmenters’ need not have stood 
out all that much from those around them, for theirs would have been a mar-
ginal activity relative to the general use of holistic forms with agreed func-
tions. Those who could segment out sections from holistic utterances for re-
combination could do so [...], while the others carried on using what they 
already knew. The analysis, operating in direct response to interactional 
need, could thus be naturally very slow, and indeed would need to be, both 
because the analyticity of the modern speaker would be little challenged by 
the holistic usages of his pre-modern companions, and because, in the short 
term, his novel expressions, while meaningful to him, would be impenetra-
ble to the rest, unless they learned them whole. But little by little, under the 
influence of even one analytic operator and his/her descendants over a num-
ber of generations, an initially immutable protolanguage could progressively 
transform into something more flexible, until a command of the flexibility 
became advantageous to survival and/or reproduction.”88 
This passage is slightly puzzling in that it calls those with the capacity to seg-
ment existing units “the first language users”. One would rather have expected that 
these segmenters be called “the first word users”: through their segmenting they 
would have arrived where Bickerton’s protolanguage users were all along, viz. in 
the possession of “a categorially complete, if severely limited vocabulary of items 
roughly equivalent to modern words, but lacking [...] any consistent structure” (see 
above). This is no doubt what Bickerton had in mind when he wrote: “All the sub-
                                                     
86  bid.: 517. 
87 The idea of a holistic protolanguage is not new. As Van Driem (2004) points out, Hugo 
Schuchardt argued already in 1919 that the first utterance arose from the splitting of a 
holistic primeval utterance (“Sprachursprung” I & II, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften 52: 716–720, 863–869). 
88 Wray & Grace 2007: 570–571. 
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stantive problems in language evolution – how symbolism got started and fixed, 
how, when, and why structure emerged, where and to what extent any of this got 
instantiated in neural tissue – remain to be solved, whether one accepts a holistic 
account or not.”89 Bickerton concludes from this that “it is more parsimonious to 
assume that language began as it was to go on – that discrete symbols, whether oral 
or manual, were there from the beginning”.90 I am not sure whether parsimony 
settles this issue, even if we were to follow Bickerton in other respects. It is at least 
conceivable that language evolution passed through various phases, starting from a 
holophrastic phase, which was then (partly) succeeded by a synthetic phase.91 
Alternatively, one might think that the very process whereby segmenting became 
possible was also responsible for at least some structure. We will return to this 
issue below. 
Let us assume, for argument’s sake, that there was once an exclusively holo-
phrastic protolanguage. The first segmenters differed from their parents on account 
of a new capacity, the capacity to segment holophrastic phrases. This new capacity 
may have had a biological basis. This, at any rate, is what Wray and Grace assume. 
Only in this way can “even one analytic operator and his/her descendants over a 
number of generations” exert the influence referred to in the above passage: if this 
capacity were cultural, there would be no need to wait a number of generations, 
and the novel expressions of the first language users would not necessarily be “im-
penetrable to the rest”. We will see below that this is not the only possible point of 
view.92 For the time being we will, however, follow Wray and Grace in assuming 
                                                     
89 Bickerton 2003: 87 (emphasis mine, JB). 
90 Ibid. Interestingly, Wray (2000: 287) invokes Occam’s razor to argue for the continuity 
between the holistic communication used by primates and the holistic language we use 
today. 
91 This is Mithen’s position (2005: 260): “This ‘words before grammar’ is the type of language 
evolution that Bickerton proposed – so we can see that his views are not necessarily wrong, 
but are simply chronologically misplaced and require a pre-existing history of holistic proto-
language to be feasible.” Wray (2002a) speaks of “the holistic system that I propose pre-
existed and provided the context for the emergence of the analytic system” (116) and of “the 
holistic protolanguage that I propose coexisted with – and preceded – the simple analytic 
system from which our modern grammatical capability developed” (ibid.: 118); see also the 
following: “there is a place for a simple analytic proto-language of the kind that Bickerton 
proposes, but not as the sole medium of communication” (ibid.). Arbib (2003: 183; cp. 2005: 
108, 118f.) introduces the notion of a prelanguage which, he suggests, was composed of 
“unitary utterances” and which preceded the discovery of words: “On this view, words in the 
modern sense co-evolved with syntax through fractionation, a process of discovery and 
diffusion quite distinct from the formation of a genetic module for grammar.” 
92 Citing Dennett (2003: 184–185), but putting language instead of religion, one might say: “If 
there are any genes for [language], this is, in fact, one of the least interesting and least 
informative of the Darwinian possibilities.” 
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that the new capacity must be thought of as being based on a genetic mutation, and 
therefore as part of biological evolution. 
The above passage from Wray and Grace’s article also presupposes that all 
members of the group, including those who do not yet possess the capacity to 
identify segments, are capable of learning new utterances. Only in this way can 
they “learn whole” expressions that are impenetrable to them. These expressions 
are not therefore genetically transmitted. This presupposition is not spelled out in 
Wray and Grace’s article, but seems to be important in view of the fact that it takes 
for granted an important difference between human protolanguage and primate 
calls, which are genetically transmitted. 
The specification that the protolanguage out of which modern language eventu-
ally arose was different from primate calls and that it consisted of learned utter-
ances that could be distinguished from each other answers a number of the objec-
tions voiced by Tallerman in her contribution to the Lingua issue, notably those 
that deal with the presumed proximity of the protolanguage to animal calls93 and 
with its presumed phonological insufficiency.94 We cannot deal with them in detail. 
Some of her other criticisms are summed up and responded to by Mithen in the 
following terms: 
“Although linguists unsympathetic to Wray’s approach, such as Derek 
Bickerton and Maggie Tallerman, have questioned the feasibility of seg-
mentation, their criticisms have been unsubstantial. Tallerman claims, for in-
stance, that the likelihood of any chance associations arising is remote, but 
computer simulations have shown that they could easily have happened [...] 
while Wray herself has explained how the process of segmentation may have 
been supported by ‘near matches’. Tallerman also claims that holistic 
utterances are unlikely to have contained multiple phonetic strings with the 
potential for segmentation because they would have been too short. But one 
need do no more than consider the lengthy holistic phrases of monkeys, 
apes, birds, and so forth, to appreciate that those of our human ancestors may 
                                                     
93 Elsewhere in her article Tallerman accepts that “protolanguages (like languages) are 
culturally transmitted” (2007: 599). 
94 See in this connection Wray 2002a: 115: “I have suggested that the holistic cries and gestures 
of our pre-human ancestors were transformed, over a long period of time, into a phonetically 
expressed set of holistic message strings [...]” (emphasis mine, JB). Also Arbib 2003: 196: 
“[T]he lowering of the larynx in humans or pre-human hominids might have served a similar 
purpose (as in the red deer, viz. deepening the animal’s roar, JB) – without denying that 
further selection could have exploited the resultant increase in degrees of freedom to increase 
the flexibility of speech production. [...] [T]his selective advantage would hold even for a 
species that employed holophrastic utterances devoid of syntax.” (Emphasis mine, JB). 
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have been of considerable length,95 having evolved over millennia and 
proliferated in number to provide ever greater semantic specificity. 
Similarly, an argument that Wray’s theory of segmentation has to assume the 
prior existence of discrete segments, which then invalidates her conception 
of holistic utterances, also has no foundation. Holistic utterances may have 
been multi-syllabic but they were – by definition – holistic, with none of the 
individual or groups of syllables mapping onto a discrete aspect of the utter-
ance’s complex meaning.”96 
It is not the aim of this Appendix to enter into an exhaustive discussion of all 
the arguments for and against the holophrastic model (whether in the form of the 
assumption that all human protolanguage was holophrastic, or rather that a holo-
phrastic protolanguage gave rise to an analytic protolanguage which in its turn 
gave rise to language). What counts at this point is that this model is not dead, far 
from it, it is alive and kicking. This allows us to consider some of its consequences. 
Wray and Grace observe: “For reasons that may be partly biological, the older the 
individual becomes, the more likely he or she is to dissect language more than is 
strictly necessary for effective general communication.”97 Since the capacity of 
dissecting language does not respond to a specific need, the result may be 
surprising: 
“Any biological influences on the balance between formulaicity and compo-
sitionality may be limited to the peripheral capacity to open up a form before 
there is a specific need to do so, thus maintaining a creative edge to one’s 
engagement with language. Since such a capacity would simply need to ex-
ist, rather than achieve any specific goal (such as a complete analysis of the 
language into atomic particles and rules), we might anticipate finding that its 
effects are haphazard and idiosyncratic – and indeed we do. 
                                                     
95 Consider in this connection the following: “In a paper with Nobuyuki Kawai, [Tetsuro] 
Matsuzawa showed that Ai, a young chimpanzee, could remember a sequence of at least five 
numbers, more than a preschool child; and at a recent symposium in Chicago on ‘The Mind 
of the Chimpanzee’, he showed how Ai, with further training, had developed powers of 
working memory beyond that of most human adults. He suggested that ‘our common 
ancestors might have had immediate memory, but in the course of evolution, they lost this 
and acquired languagelike skills.’” (Sacks 2007: 159, n. 8; see further Kawai & Matsuzawa 
2000, and Cohen 2007). 
96 Mithen 2005: 254. 
97 Wray & Grace 2007: 561. 
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One individual might suddenly wonder what it is that is ‘done’ in how do 
you do?, while another notices that barking seems to contain the morphemes 
bar and king. Such inappropriate analyses will capture attention whereas 
others, that turn out to be rational in terms of the shared perceptions of com-
positional structure in the language, are simply absorbed.”98 
The “peripheral capacity” referred to in this passage is central to the holo-
phrastic model (in either of its two forms). The model predicts this capacity, and 
would indeed be empty without it. The existence of this capacity in modern hu-
mans, on the other hand, does not suffice to prove the correctness of the holo-
phrastic model. The fact that one sometimes wonders what is ‘done’ in how do you 
do? does not, by itself, prove that human language arose out of a protolanguage (or 
proto-protolanguage) which was holistic. However, if it could be demonstrated that 
the capacity to open up forms before there is a specific need to do so is more than a 
capacity, that it is a proclivity that manifests itself in various ways across human 
cultures and stages of development, this would constitute an argument in support of 
the holophrastic model. Such a proclivity would be harder to account for in the 
synthetic model, for here words are extracted to correspond to pre-existing con-
cepts. The widely attested use of semantic etymologies (discussed in Appendix 1, 
above) provides such a demonstration. 
 
Let us now restate some of the objections that have been voiced against the holo-
phrastic model. Bickerton, in a passage already cited, found fault with Wray’s 
hypothetical example in which, besides tebima meaning give that to her, and 
kumapi meaning share this with her, early language users might conclude that ma 
had the meaning female person + beneficiary. Bickerton’s criticism took the fol-
lowing form: 
“This leaves out of account the possibility that, although the syllable ma 
might occur as Wray suggests, it would also occur in a number of holo-
phrases lacking any references to either females or beneficiaries. Not only is 
this extremely likely, but the only possible alternative is, if anything, even 
more damaging to Wray’s case. For if ma occurred always and only where 
female beneficiaries were involved, the holophrastic protolanguage would be 
a hollow charade, a mere disguise for a medium already fully synthetic. But 
if ma also occurred where a female + beneficiary was impossible – contexts 
perhaps as numerous as, or more numerous than, those that can bear such a 
reading – why would the hearer assume that it referred to a female 
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beneficiary in just those cases where such a reading was possible, and how 
would that hearer account for the other cases?”99 
Tallerman discusses the same hypothetical example and comments: 
“A major problem in this regard is that logically, similar substrings must 
often occur in two (or more) utterances which do not share any common 
elements of meaning at least as many times as they occur in two utterances 
which do share semantic elements. For instance, suppose that a string mabali 
also contains the ma sequence, but means ‘put that rock down!’. What en-
sures that ma gets associated with ‘her’?”100 
Bickerton and Tallerman are probably not aware of the fact that reflections 
similar to theirs occur already in one of Plato’s Dialogues, the Cratylus. This Dia-
logue presents Socrates in discussion with Cratylus, an etymologist. Socrates sub-
jects the procedure of (semantic) etymologising to a thorough analysis. This 
procedure is not dissimilar, in Socrates’ analysis, to the extraction of ma in the 
above hypothetical examples. Socrates would call ma a “primary name”; he further 
maintains that primary names are by their very nature like the things they denote.101 
In the course of his analysis he comes to assign certain meanings to various letters 
of the Greek alphabet: the letter rho is expressive of speed, motion, and hardness; 
the letter lambda is like smoothness, softness, and other qualities. However, this 
leads to difficulties in words like sklêrótês which, though containing the letter 
lambda, means “hardness”.102 Like Bickerton and Tallerman, Socrates considers 
these difficulties insurmountable: “I myself prefer the theory that names are, so far 
as possible, like the things named; but really this attractive force of likeness is [...] 
a poor thing, and we are compelled to employ in addition this commonplace expe-
dient, convention, to establish the correctness of names”.103 
Socrates was not, of course, discussing the transition from protolanguage to 
language. He was concerned with semantic etymologies. Just as Bickerton and 
Tallerman try to undermine the hypothesis of a holistic protolanguage, Socrates’ 
arguments should have discouraged semantic etymologising. They did no such 
thing. Consider the reflections of Isidore of Seville, the sixth-century author of a 
monumental work called, precisely, Etymologies. About etymologies he says, 
among other things:104 
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“Etymologies of words are furnished either from their rationale (causa), as 
‘kings’ (rex, gen. regis) from [...] ‘acting correctly’ (recte agendum); or from 
their origin, as ‘man’ (homo) because he is from ‘earth’ (humus), or from the 
contrary, as ‘mud’ (lutum) from ‘washing’ (lavare, ppl. lutus), since mud is 
not clean, and ‘grove’ (lucus), because, darkened by its shade, it is scarcely 
‘lit’ (lucere).” 
Isidore should perhaps have followed Socrates’ example and pondered upon the 
question whether there is some meaning that can be ascribed to the sound sequence 
hom/hum and that recurs in all formations of which this sequence is part. He might 
have offered similar reflections with regard to lu and luc. He did not. Difficult 
cases and counterexamples clearly did not discourage him. 
Examples of etymologies like these can be cited from widely different cultures 
and literatures; further examples are provided by children and psychiatric patients. 
This has been shown in Appendix 1. Strictly speaking they do not extract meaning-
ful segments, at least not explicitly. It is, however, clear that they are based on the 
similarity or identity of parts of the words compared. In many cases there is no 
linguistic justification whatsoever for these semantic etymologies. This is stated in 
so many words in a text from ancient India that deals with etymologising, Yaska’s 
Nirukta. Ancient India too had a sophisticated tradition of grammar, which obliged 
scholars to distinguish between the two activities. Yaska’s position in this matter is 
clear: etymologising is the complement of grammar, it treads where grammar can-
not go.105 
Consider now Sverker Johansson’s criticism of the idea of a holistic protolan-
guage:106 
“It is not obvious to me [...] why the segmentation process envisaged by 
Wray [...] would be expected to work. A similar process is certainly present 
in modern-day language acquisition – children first acquire some stock 
phrases as unanalyzed wholes, and later figure out their internal structure – 
but that only works because these stock phrases have an internal structure, 
given by the grammar of the adults from whom the child acquires them.”107 
Johansson assumes (as do Bickerton and Tallerman) that the segmentation 
process can only work where the material already contains, in a consistent and 
organised manner, the segments that are being extracted. Socrates would agree, for 
he refers repeatedly to the name-givers who gave names to things in a long distant 
past. But not all semantic etymologies are based on this belief. Most semantic 
etymologising takes place quite independently of it. Semantic etymologising 
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“works”, i.e. it is practised, in spite of the fact that the words and phrases dealt with 
do not have any relevant internal structure. We must conclude that there is a widely 
attested proclivity to extract segments and assign meanings to them even in cases 
where the material is inconsistent and resists such segmentation. This proclivity 
coincides in all essentials with the capacity to segment postulated by the upholders 
of the theory of a holophrastic protolanguage. It is not limited to situations in 
which the prior existence of discrete segments has to be assumed. This, then, does 
away with some of the most serious criticism of the idea of a holophrastic 
protolangage. 
 
Having come this far, let us consider in some detail what the transition from holis-
tic protolanguage users to segmenters implies. It has been suggested that a genetic 
mutation may be responsible, but this remains vague. Indeed, it amounts to little 
more than giving a name (“genetic mutation”) to a process which one does not 
understand. And yet, the process concerned may not escape understanding, and 
what is more, it is open to question whether a genetic mutation has to be postulated 
to explain it. 
The event which turns holophrasts into segmenters may be nothing else than 
crossing the symbolic threshold. Our hominid ancestors crossed this threshold 
(phylogenetically) many thousands of years ago, and all human beings who learn to 
use language do the same (ontogenetically) during their early years.  
Symbolic reference even seems able to explain at least some of the syntactic 
rules of language. Deacon argues, to begin with, “that the structure of [Universal 
Grammar] would not yield to a biological evolutionary solution, nor would it have 
a neurological explanation”.108 According to him, many structural features of lan-
guage may derive from semiotic constraints, inherent in the requirements for pro-
ducing symbolic reference. Indeed, “some major universals of grammar may come 
for free, so to speak, required by the nature of symbolic communication itself”.109 
Deacon is of the view that “it may turn out that many core features of [Universal 
Grammar] – recursive operations, the minimally diadic structure of sentences, and 
many subjacency, ordering, and dependency constraints of grammar – trace their 
origin to [...] indexical [...] requirements [which] apply to all symbolic linguistic 
relationships”.110 As a result, “theoretical efforts now directed toward showing how 
innate [Universal Grammar] could have evolved and how it might be instantiated 
in brains could well turn out to be mere intellectual exercises”.111 
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It would seem, then, that the crossing of the symbolic threshold had a double ef-
fect on the forms of communication of our remote ancestors. Symbolic reference 
enabled them to segment the holophrastic utterances (or other forms of communi-
cation, e.g. gestures) they had hitherto employed. On top of that, symbolic refer-
ence imposed certain constraints on the combined use of the resulting segments. 
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